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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of private labeling on retailer competition -an issue neglected
in literature until now. Once implemented, private labeling may well be less favorable to society
than previously thought because it can encourage consolidation of the retail industry. Either with
linear pricing (when goods are not loose substitutes) or with wholesale price discrimination (when
goods are not loose substitutes), the vertical channel is inclined to promote a retail monopoly while
consumers prefer some retail competition. This conflict of interest would not arise in the absence
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1. Introduction  
 
Grocery retailing has been characterized in recent years by a significant increase in firm 
concentration, average store size and private label offerings. Private labels, also known as 
store brands, are retailers’ own-branded products in competition with the national brands 
produced by manufacturers. 
According to ACNielsen (2005),1 private label penetration,  measured by the 
private label share in the value of grocery sales,2 is the highest in Western Europe with a 
share of 23%, compared to 19% in Canada and 16% in the United States.  In the other 
advanced economies in Pacific Asia and emerging countries, the share is below 4%, 
except in New Zealand, Australia, and Eastern European countries where the share is 
10%. 
However, there is wide variance in private label penetration between countries 
and between product categories. Among Western European countries, private labeling is 
most prevalent in Switzerland (45%), Germany (30%), Great Britain (28%) and Spain 
(26%).  It is less prevalent in Italy (11%), Portugal (11%), Finland (10%), Norway (8%), 
Ireland (7%) and Greece (4%). Between product categories, while all types of food 
except for baby food (e.g. refrigerated, frozen, shelf-stable, pet food) have high private 
label shares, ranging from a minimum of 19% for shelf-stable food to a maximum of 32% 
for refrigerated food; private label share is negligible for baby food (2%), cosmetics 
(2%), personal care (5%) and alcoholic beverages (6%).  
Private labeling has been the subject of theoretical and empirical studies. 
However, while the latter are numerous (Steiner, 2004,  survey the literature), the former 
are few (Bergès-Sennou et. al.,  2004, survey that literature. The most notable theoretical 
studies include Wolinsky (1987), Mills (1995, 1999), Raju et. al. (1995), Narasimhan-
Wilcox (1998), Bontems et al (1999), Scott Morton-Zettelmeyer (2004), Soberman-
Parker (2004), Bergès-Sennou and Waterson (2005), Bergès-Sennou (2006) and 
Gabrielsen-Sorgard (2007).3 The theoretical studies can be separated into two subsets4: 
the first (Mills, Raju et al. and Bontems et al.) shows that the introduction of a private 
label reduces both wholesale and retail national brand prices and increases sales.5 
                                                          
1 ACNielsen (2005a) collected yearly data (e.g. March 2004 to March 2005) on 80 grocery product 
categories, some of which are non-food, in 38 countries of which 17 in Western Europe, 4 in Eastern Europe, 
2 in North America, 8 in Pacific Asia, 6 in Latin America and 1 in Africa. 
2 Given that private labels are on average priced 31% lower than national brands, measuring private label 
share in value rather than in volume underestimates private label penetration. 
3 Katz’s (1987) model could be interpreted as a competition game between a national brand and a private 
label but its assumption of product homogeneity makes this interpretation rather implausible. 
4 While the recent contribution by Gabrielsen-Sorgard (2007) could belong in both these subsets, 
the one by Bergès-Sennou and Waterson (2005) does not belong in either. It does not belong to the first 
subset because instead of assuming linear pricing, it assumes a wholesale two-part tariff and, hence, no 
double mark-up problem arises. It does not belong to the second subset because retailers’ bargaining power 
in dealing with national brand manufacturers does not increase with private labeling.  
5 This occurs in Bontems et. al. to the extent that the quality of the private label is not too high, lower than 
that of the national brand, because the marginal cost of producing a private label is assumed as an increasing 
and convex function of quality.  
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Channel profit and consumer surplus both increase and the retailer is able to capture a 
higher fraction of the former. Private labeling is thus good because it alleviates the classic 
double marginalization problem. The second subset of studies (Narasimhan-Wilcox, Scott 
Morton-Zettelmeyer6) shows that the retailer, by introducing a private label, is able to 
improve his bargaining position in negotiations with the national brand manufacturer but 
causes a reduction in the channel profit. In Narasimhan-Wilcox for instance, in the most 
interesting equilibrium case, the reduction in the wholesale national brand price 
consequent to private labeling does not bring about a demand increase (since demand is 
assumed inelastic), so that the loss suffered by the national brand manufacturer under 
private labeling is larger than the gain obtained by the retailer. Some consumers benefit 
from buying the private label at a lower price and as a result consumer surplus increases 
with private labeling.
The latest development in product-lines literature is connected with private 
labeling. Avenel-Caprice (2006) studied the choice of the optimal product line in a 
vertical structure composed of manufacturers and retailers with market power -a situation 
typical of national brand/private label competition. In a vertical differentiation model 
where a high quality item (i.e. a national brand) is offered by a monopolist while a low 
quality item (i.e. a private label) is offered by a competitive fringe, they show that 
different product lines can emerge as an equilibrium outcome according to parameter 
values. Our analysis, which overcomes the perfect substitutability hypothesis between 
different private labels proposed by Avenel-Caprice, will offer two interesting insights on 
this theme.    
However, the assumption of a monopoly retailer is common to all private label 
models (except Avenel-Caprice), leaving aside the issue of how private labeling interacts 
with retailer competition. It would be interesting to see whether private labeling promotes 
retailer competition, reduces it, or leaves it unchanged.  
If private labeling significantly affected retailer competition, it could not be 
considered simply as a bargaining tool in the hands of retailers to get more payoff from 
manufacturers in their vertical dealings because it would produce external effects with 
significant impact on third parties, including consumers. If this was the case, an overall 
welfare assessment becomes more difficult.    
To achieve this, it is necessary to assess not only the short run effect of private 
labeling on prices, sales and profits but also its medium-long term effect on (retailer) 
competition. 
Moreover, pricing has been crucially restricted to linear even at wholesale level7
whereas nonlinear pricing is a common practice in vertical relationships between 
manufacturers and retailers. Some form of wholesale nonlinear pricing could indeed be 
practiced by a manufacturer, even as a defensive move against private labeling, so that 
ignoring it would mean overlooking a potentially important part of the story. 
                                                          
6 Unlike Narasimhan-Wilcox, Scott Morton-Zettelmeyer focus on the strategic importance for retailers of 
deciding the brand positioning of private labels in their supply terms negotiations with manufacturers.
7 Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer, Bergès-Sennou and Waterson, Avenel and Caprice represent recent 
exceptions to this.
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The main objective of this paper is to offer a theoretical analysis on how private 
labeling affects competition between retailers, while also considering its interaction with 
wholesale pricing.
When this is complete, a new offsetting effect of private labeling is added to the 
conventional effect of encouraging low prices and high consumer surplus. According to 
this new effect, private labeling makes a concentrated retail industry more appealing for 
the vertical channel. With linear prices, this occurs when all brands are close substitutes. 
With wholesale price discrimination, this effect occurs for a larger range of product 
substitutability, that is, when goods are not loose substitutes.    
Moreover, under wholesale price discrimination, the national brand manufacturer 
makes a larger profit when dealing with a downstream monopoly than when dealing with 
a downstream duopoly.  Thus, the vertical channel finds it profitable to eliminate 
downstream competition, even though this harms consumers.  
Intuitively, when marketing a private label, a retailer, by becoming multiproduct, 
internalizes the negative cross-effect of one brand’s demand on the other brand’s price, 
due to imperfect brand substitutability. This induces them to avoid offering too much of 
one brand which would bring about a reduction in the other brand’s price. This effect is 
particularly strong when brands are close substitutes. When this occurs, they are more 
inclined to limit the respective supplies of brands with the aim of maintaining higher 
retail prices.
This explains why, under linear pricing, a monopoly retailer, able to set higher 
prices than a Cournot duopoly, is preferable for the downstream industry.8 The 
downstream industry’s gain coming from (downstream) monopolization is strong enough, 
when goods are close substitutes, to offset the corresponding loss made by the national 
brand manufacturer due to a reduction in national brand sales. When wholesale (perfect) 
price discrimination is feasible, the effect of private labeling in consolidating the retail 
industry worsens. The national brand manufacturer can partly exploit the downstream 
profit increase due to monopolization through fixed fees, even though they have to leave 
the retailer a strictly positive reservation profit, coming from the retailer’s ability to 
refuse to distribute the national brand and sell only their private label.  
For these reasons, in a medium-long term perspective, private labeling may be 
less favorable to society than commonly thought. The concerns recently expressed by 
Dobson (1998) and Clarke et al. (2002) along the lines that private labeling may 
contribute to increased concentration in retailing are fully confirmed by our analysis. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We sketch out the model in section 2. In section 
3, we  study the no-private-labeling case as a useful benchmark. In section 4, private 
labeling is introduced under linear pricing. In section 5 we study private labeling under 
wholesale price discrimination. Concluding remarks are included in section 6. An 
appendix ends the paper. 
                                                          
8 Of course the incumbent retailer would prefer to remain a monopolist while the entrant retailer would prefer 
a downstream duopoly. When the former’s gain prevails on the latter’s loss, however, the downstream 
industry should be in favor of being organized as a monopoly.
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2. The Model 
A monopoly manufacturer produces a national brand and sells to two retailers, each of 
whom can also distribute their own private label, purchased from an upstream 
competitive fringe9.
A private label is an imperfect substitute for the national brand due either to a 
difference in quality or in advertising (or both) creating this perception in consumers. The 
two private labels are also differentiated products: as retailer-specific brands, unique to 
each retailer, it seems quite natural to see them as imperfect substitutes. In focusing on 
these three sources of product differentiation, for the sake of tractability, no further 
source of differentiation is assumed. The consumer is thus indifferent regarding which 
retailer to buy the national brand from.  
An important issue concerns the type of product differentiation that fits 
competition between national brands and private labels better. While, traditionally, 
vertical product differentiation has been preferred, in recent times, the development of 
premium private labels by important and large retailers who advertise heavily (e.g. the 
British Tesco or the Swiss Migros) has given support to the view that horizontal product 
differentiation fits it better. Premium private labels have closed the quality gap with 
national brands. Given this, we have decided to follow here the latter approach, already 
followed by Wolinsky (1987) among others. However, comparing the obtained 
qualitative results by the two different approaches and noting that they are similar, we 
can well state that the type of product differentiation is not crucial in private label 
models. 
All the three products (one national brand and two private labels) are produced 
with the same constant-unit-cost technology.10 For simplicity, and without any further 
loss of generality, let us take this production unit cost to be zero. Furthermore, a retailer’s 
demand quantity is assumed to be equal to the amount demanded by his customers, in 
accordance with a just-in-time manufacturing-delivery philosophy.  
On advertising we will start by assuming that it is given.11 This implies that its 
contribution to make national brands and private labels as imperfect substitutes is taken 
exogenously and that its cost is sunk. Afterwards however, we will study what happens if 
the national brand manufacturer could endogenously affect product substitutability 
                                                          
9 One of the key issues in this literature is who will produce the private label (either a competitive fringe or 
national brand manufacturers). Only very recently has this issue been dealt with in a theoretical model 
[Bergès-Sennou (2006)], while the literature has mostly assumed what is perhaps more typical of a grocery 
market: private labels are produced by a competitive fringe. Only Wolinsky and Soberman-Parker consider 
the case of dual branding, in which private labels are produced by national brand manufacturers. Both cases 
are empirically observed but it is difficult to assess their relative frequency. However they share an important 
common feature: private labels have a smaller purchasing cost for retailers than competing leading national 
brands.
10 The likely advantage due to economies of scale for a national brand manufacturer against a private label 
producer should be roughly offset by the higher wages that the former pays for his employees relative to the 
latter. Barsky et. al. (2001) argue that this is typical in the US food industries.
11 In other words we assume that advertising is determined over a longer period than that necessary to change 
the number of active firms on the market -something that is not implausible.
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through advertising when the cost of the latter is not sunk but depends (linearly) on the 
amount of advertising made. 
In the initial game with advertising as given, decisions by manufacturers and 
retailers are taken sequentially according to the following perfect and complete 
information two-stage game: in the first stage, given the feasible wholesale pricing 
scheme, manufacturers set wholesale prices and fixed fees (when available). In the 
second stage, retailers, given the wholesale prices and possibly the upstream fixed fees, 
and anticipating the consumers’ demands, determine the retail quantities offered 
according to a Cournot subgame12.
In the game with endogenous advertising, we add a new stage at the beginning 
where the national brand manufacturer decides the amount of advertising and through it 
the degrees of product substitutability between his product and private labels. 
In both games, in the last stage, retailers are free to choose which product to 
market out of three alternative options: only the national brand, only their private label or 
both the national brand and their private label. We search for pure-strategies subgame 
perfect equilibria, on which our analysis will be focused.   
We initially assume upstream monopoly pricing, but the retailer’s ability to offer 
a private label, by increasing his reservation profit to a strictly positive amount, brings 
into our model some buyer bargaining power in dealing with the manufacturer. However, 
we will discuss later the effect of having some bargaining between bilateral monopolists.  
Vertical contracts are assumed public and non renegotiable, so that they entail full 
commitment value (see note 17 for more comments on this).  
To enable closed form solutions of the model, we follow Dobson-Waterson 
(1996)  and assume retail demands for the three products from maximizing the   
following quasi-linear quadratic utility function: 
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where  denotes quantity demand.   For each q , the first subscript ( i ) refers to the 
specific brand: 0 for national brand, 1 for retailer 1’s private label, 2 for retailer 2’s 
private label; its second subscript (
q
j ) refers to the distributing retailer (1 or 2). Since 
only the national brand can be sold by both retailers, the latter subscript has to be 
                                                          
12 With differentiated products, it is well-known that the choice between price and quantity competition is 
not crucial, given that they show very similar results. Another reason for assuming downstream Cournot 
competition is given by the existence of capacity constraints in the retailing industry. We know from Kreps-
Scheinkman (1983) that, under plausible conditions, price competition with binding capacity constraints is 
the same as Cournot competition.
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specified only when the former subscript is zero. represents the exogenously given 
amount of the numeraire. We have three crucial parameters measuring the respective 
degrees of product substitutability in the utility function: 
o
q
  represents the degree of 
product substitutability between the national brand and retailer 1’s private label; 
represents the degree of product substitutability between the national brand and retailer 
2’s private label;   represents the degree of product substitutability between the two 
private labels. The corresponding degree of product differentiation between brands is the 
inverse of that of product substitutability. 
From straightforward consumer utility maximization, the following inverse 
demands for the three products are obtained:
                                                                          (2) 
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represents the i-th good’s retail price. The maximum reservation price that buyers are 
willing to pay for these items in terms of the numeraire has been normalized to one. 
Unfortunately, with three product substitutability parameters, the problem is algebraically 
intractable, so a simplification is needed. The restriction 
i
p
  is not acceptable because, 
since the two private labels have the same degree of product substitutability with the 
national brand, this would imply that they are perfect substitutes, thus violating the 
essence of private labels as retailer-specific brands. A reasonable way, already followed 
by Dobson-Waterson (1996), to keep the plausible asymmetries between private labels 
but ensuring algebraic tractability, is to nest the restriction   .13 In this way, we 
can focus only on two degrees of product substitutability:   and  . If the two private 
labels were perfect substitutes ( 1 ), this would still imply that the degrees of product 
differentiation between the national brand and each private label are the same (   ).
But we are now also able to treat the realistic case 1	 .
Under this condition,   and  are different from each other and hence some 
asymmetry arises due to different degrees of substitutability between goods. When 
advertising is given, being the private label’s wholesale price set at marginal cost 
                                                          
13 Nothing important would change if we instead restricted   .
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assumed as zero14, the respective profit functions for retailers and the manufacturer can 
be written as follows 
j
q
j
p
j
qvp
j
d

0
)
0
( .2,1j                                                      (5) 
                                                                                            (6) )
0201
( qqv
u

Where  represents the national brand’s uniform wholesale price; the superscript 
stands for downstream, u for upstream. Let us now solve the model under no private 
labeling, a useful benchmark to assess the effect of private labeling on retailer 
competition. 
v
d
3.  The Benchmark: No Private Labeling 
Equation (2) under the restriction  becomes: . Let us 
first focus on linear pricing and afterwards on wholesale price discrimination.   
0
21
 qq
0201
1
0
qqp 
3.1 Linear Pricing
Given that , the retailers’ profit can be written as follows: 
. Equation (6) remains valid as manufacturer profit. Using backward 
induction to solve the game, we start with the last stage subgame.    
0
21
 qq
j
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j
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When there are two active retailers competing à la Cournot, the retail quantities 
are simultaneously set by them to maximize their individual profit subject to the above 
given inverse product demand. From the first order conditions, the two retailers' reaction 
functions can be obtained as follows:  with 
Substituting, the following retailers’ equilibrium demand functions are 
found: . In the first stage, the monopoly manufacturer sets the linear 
wholesale uniform price by maximizing  subject to the two retailers’ equilibrium 
demand functions already established. It is easy to see that the optimal solution for  is 
equal to  The equilibrium quantity of the good sold by each retailer is . The 
equilibrium retail price is . The retailer’s equilibrium profit is . The 
manufacturer's equilibrium profit is 1/6 . The channel profit, , is 
2/)
0
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0
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14 The results are insensitive to restricting the profit functions to zero wholesale price for the private labels 
immediately.
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therefore equal to . Welfare can be measured à la Marshall by summing net 
consumer utility and channel profit. We thus get:  where U is given by (1) 
under the restriction . In equilibrium we get: .
9/2
o
qUW 
0
21
 qq 18/5
When there is a monopoly retailer (let us now assume also that ), it is 
easily shown that the retailer’s equilibrium demand is equal to 
0
02
q
2/)1( v .  The upstream 
monopolist still finds it optimal to set 2/1v . As a consequence, the monopoly retailer 
sells in equilibrium  at a retail price of  and makes a profit of . The 
monopoly manufacturer makes an equilibrium profit of . Consequently the 
equilibrium channel profit is now equal to  while welfare is equal to .
4/1 4/3 16/1
8/1
16/3 32/7
Comparing the two-retailer case with that of a monopoly retailer, we notice that 
channel profit is higher with two retailers than with one. Consumers also benefit from a 
reduced retail price and hence welfare also increases with downstream competition.  
3.2 Wholesale Price Discrimination 
Now consider the case where the national brand manufacturer can practice perfect price 
discrimination. To do so, it is sufficient for the latter to use a set of (retailer-specific) two-
part tariffs. While the inverse demand function for the national brand is unchanged 
relative to that of the subsection 3.1, the respective retailers’ and manufacturer’s profit 
now become:  with  and 
.  represents the fixed fee paid by the j-th 
retailer. When there are two active retailers, Cournot competition at the last stage gives 
rise to the following reaction functions:  for 
The resulting equilibrium retailer demand functions are    for 
 In the first stage, the upstream monopolist determines the fully 
extracting fixed fees as follows: ; consequently his profit becomes 
equal to the channel profit: . After having substituted the 
retailers’ equilibrium demands in the inverse demand function and then in the 
manufacturer’s profit function, we are in a position to determine the optimal wholesale 
j
F
j
q
j
vp
j
d

0
 )
0
( 2,1j
21022011
FFqvqv
u

j
F
2/)
0
1(
0 k
q
j
v
j
q  .;2,1, kjkj 
3/)21(
0 k
v
j
v
j
q 
.;2,1, kjkj 
j
q
j
vp
j
F
0
)
0
( 
)
0201
(
0
qqp
u

8 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 6 [2008], Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol6/iss1/art5
price. It is easy to show that the optimal solution is: . There are infinite 
combinations of and satisfying this condition. The equilibrium industry quantity is 
consequently equal to: . Hence, in equilibrium, we have: 
and .
2/1
21
 vv
1
v
2
v
2/1
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 qq 2/1
0
p
4/1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When there is only one active retailer (assume now also that ), the 
inverse demand for the national brand is:  and, as with linear pricing, the 
equilibrium retailer demand results in:
0
02
q
01
1
0
qp 
2/)1( v . The extracting fixed fee is set at: 
. The upstream monopolist’s profit is still equal to the channel profit 
and yields: . After having substituted the equilibrium retailer demand 
in the inverse demand function and then in the manufacturer’s profit function, we are in a 
position to optimally determine v , which turns out to be zero (marginal cost pricing). 
Consequently, the optimal values for quantity and price are both . The equilibrium 
national brand manufacturer profit, equal to the channel profit, is equal to .
01
)
0
( qvpF 
010
qp
u

2/1
4/1
Comparing the two-retailer case with that of a monopoly retailer, it emerges that 
final price and  industry sales remain unchanged when the number of active retailers 
increases from one to two. Consequently the equilibrium manufacturer profit, the retailer 
profit and the channel profit also do not change. The only change involves the wholesale 
price, which is decreased under downstream monopoly to the marginal cost level. This 
however produces no further effect.
4. Private Labeling with Linear Pricing
As shown in section 3, when there is no private labeling and with linear pricing, both 
channel profit and welfare increase when the number of active retailers increases from 
one to two. No conflict of interest arises between the channel and consumers. Is this 
result still true with private labeling? 
We deal with this question in this section. Let us assume what often occurs in 
practice: both retailers are ready to market a private label. We first focus on linear 
uniform pricing; we will relax this assumption in the next section. As already done with 
no private labeling, we start by studying the model under a downstream duopoly; we will 
then study it under a downstream monopoly; finally, we will compare the outcomes of 
the two cases studied. 
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Applying backward induction, we start at the last stage subgame. Retailers, given 
 and anticipating consumers’ demands, simultaneously choose the national brand and 
their private label quantities to offer, with the aim of maximizing their own profit. They 
thus solve the following problem: with  The 
four reaction functions obtained can be expressed in the following matrix equation: 
, where: 
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By inverting matrix  and post-multiplying it with vector , we get the four equilibrium 
product demands by the two retailers, all dependent on , which we report in the 
Appendix as (A1)-(A4). In stage 1, the monopoly manufacturer sets v  by solving the 
following problem:  After some easy algebra, the solution 
turns out to be 
A v
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Substituting (7) in (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A4) we find the solutions for quantities reported 
in Appendix as (A5)-(A8). Then, substituting the latter in (2), (3) and (4), we find the 
solutions for prices. Lastly, substituting all the solutions found in the profit functions, we 
get the solutions for profits. Summing up the three profits, we find the solution for the 
channel profit, reported in the Appendix as (A9). 
Substituting the equilibrium quantities in (1), we can find the equilibrium 
welfare, also reported in the Appendix as (A10). Comparing the solutions obtained under 
private labeling with those prevailing under no private labeling, we see that private 
labeling is always profitable for retailers.15 The national brand manufacturer loses from 
                                                          
15 This does not always occur in other models: in Mills (1995) for example, private labeling is profitable for 
a monopoly retailer only for a given parameter range. This difference however is not due to the assumed type 
of product differentiation (vertical vs. horizontal) but to the marginal cost normalization. If we indeed 
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private labeling but since retailers’ gains largely offset the manufacturer’s loss, channel 
profit increases with private labeling. Consumers gain from private labeling and hence 
welfare increases.
Let us now study the model with a monopoly retailer. Suppose for instance that 
retailer 2 is the only active retailer. Only products 0 and 2 are then on the market. Product 
1, retailer 1’s private label, is gone. Hence we have: . The inverse product 
demands are thus the following two:  and
. At stage 2, the retailer chooses both the national brand and his 
private label quantities on offer with the aim of maximizing his own profit: 
.
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          Substituting the two first order conditions in each one, we get the following 
retailer’s equilibrium product demands: and
. In stage 1, the national brand manufacturer chooses his 
wholesale price to maximize his profit: . The solution is 
)(c )
2
1(2/)1(
02
  vq )(d
)
2
1(2/)1(
2
  vq
).(.  
02)(
max ctsvq
v
2/)1(  . Substituting the latter in and , we find the following solutions for 
exchanged quantities:  and . Equilibrium 
prices are then:  and . The retailer’s profit is thus equal to 
)(c )(d
)1(4/1
02
q )1(4/)2(
2
 q
4/)3(
0
p 2/1
2
p
)1(16/)35(   , while the manufacturer’s profit is equal to )1(8/)1(   .
Hence the channel profit is equal to )1(16/)7(   . Consequently, welfare is in 
equilibrium equal to )1(32/)519(   .
Having solved the model under private labeling with some downstream 
competition (duopoly) and with no downstream competition (monopoly), we can now 
compare these two cases. Being aware of the results of this comparison under no private 
labeling, we are in a position to study the effect of private labeling on individual and 
social desirability of some downstream competition.  
                                                                                                                                                              
normalized the constant marginal cost to zero in the Mills’ model (as we did in our model), we would find 
that private labeling would become always profitable.
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While, under private labeling, welfare with some retailer competition is always 
higher than that with no retailer competition -just compute the difference between (A10) 
and welfare under downstream monopoly and study its sign -  this is not the case for 
channel profit. Channel profit with a monopoly retailer can be greater than that with a 
duopoly. Everything depends on parameter values. We need to make a numerical analysis 
to identify the parameter conditions under which this occurs. Computing the difference 
between (A9) and the channel profit under downstream monopoly, it is indeed shown that 
the channel profit is greater with a downstream monopoly than with a duopoly, provided 
that either all products are very close substitutes (   and  both close to one) or that, 
with the two private labels close substitutes ( 8.0 ), the national brand and the private 
label are not too differentiated. The higher  , the lower   can be, to ensure that the 
channel profit is greater under downstream monopoly than under duopoly. This occurs in 
region B in the following figure 

                  1                                                     0.8
                                                                                         B
                                                A 
                                                                                                                                              
0.1

A=Channel profit higher with downstream duopoly                                                                                
B= Channel profit higher with downstream monopoly   
Figure 1- Comparing Channel Profit with a Downstream Duopoly Against  
                Downstream Monopoly under Private Labeling and Linear  
                Pricing. 
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Region B disappears with no private labeling. The downward-sloping convex curve in the 
graph represents the iso-channel-profit curve, such that: )()( monopduop  .The
following proposition has thus been demonstrated 
Proposition 1.  With private labeling and under linear pricing, channel profit with a 
downstream monopoly is higher than with a downstream Cournot duopoly, provided that 
we are in region B in figure 1. Welfare, however, is always higher with a downstream 
duopoly. 
To help grasp the economic intuition behind the proposition, let us look at 
table 1, which presents a numerical simulation taken both with private labeling (for 
specific cases both in region A and B) and without private labeling .  The table shows 
that, with no private labeling, the national brand manufacturer strongly prefers a 
downstream duopoly to a downstream monopoly ( equal to 0.1667 rather than 0.125) 
because he can sell much more ( equal to 0.3334 rather than 0.25) at the same 
wholesale price (  in both cases). The downstream industry, on the contrary, 
prefers to be organized as a monopoly (a profit of 0.0625 being better than 0.0556) 
because the retail price and thus its profit margin would increase and this prevails on the 
induced reduction in sales. We know that the former effect prevails on the latter so that 
the vertical channel, with no private labeling, prefers to have downstream competition 
(0.2223 better than 0.1875). But when private labels as very close substitutes to each 
other are marketed (
u

0201
qq 
5.0v
99.0 ), the downstream industry’s profit is much higher under a 
downstream monopoly (0.2708) than under a downstream duopoly (0.2421). 
Furthermore, the national brand sales increase due to downstream competition 
(0.1114+0.1107-0.1667=0.0544) is smaller in this case than that under no private labeling 
(0.1667+0.1667-0.25=0.0831). This brings about an increase in the national brand 
manufacturer profit due to downstream competition (0.0556-0.0417=0.0139) that is 
smaller than that obtained with no private labeling (0.1667-0.125 = 0.0417). It follows 
that the small gain made by the national brand manufacturer when some downstream 
competition is introduced is certainly not sufficient to convince retailers to go on 
competing with each other, giving up the opportunity of a horizontal merger or a cartel (a 
loss of 0.2708-0.2421 = 0.0285). So, when private labels as very close substitutes to each 
other are marketed, channel profit is larger with a downstream monopoly than with a 
downstream duopoly. Consumers, however, always prefer some downstream competition 
to a downstream monopoly, because of reduced prices and more product variety. This 
gain always prevails on the possible channel profit loss and hence welfare is higher with 
a downstream duopoly, both with and without private labeling, as confirmed in table 1. 
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  Table 1 - A Numerical Simulation under Linear Pricing 
                             Private Labeling        ( 5.0 )         No Private Labeling 
 DUOP 
   99.0  
( )495.0  
MON DUOP 
  5.0
( )25.0
DUOP MON 
01
q      0.1114     0   0.1506   0.1667      0.25 
02
q      0.1107  0.1667  0.0775          0.1667        0 
1
q      0.2797     0   0.3699       0        0 
2
q      0.2784  0.4167   0.3311       0        0 
v      0.2504   0.25   0.2708     0.5                0.5 
0
p      0.5003   0.625   0.5139  0.6667             0.75 
1
p      0.3348       /   0.4075       /         / 
2
p      0.3337     0.5   0.3699       /        / 
1
d
      0.1215       /   0.1873  0.0278           0.0625 
2
d
      0.1206  0.2708   0.1413    0.0278        0 
u
      0.0556  0.0417   0.0618   0.1667     0.125 
      0.2977  0.3125   0.3904   0.2223     0.1875 
W     0.5389  0.4479   0.6598   0.2778     0.2188 
 
Thus, with private labeling, in region B in figure 1, firms might well reach an 
agreement to consolidate the retail industry and promote a downstream monopoly, even if 
this is not in the interest of consumers and society as a whole. Since this conflict of 
interests does not occur with no private labeling -more retail competition is in 
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everybody's interest in this case- it is right to claim that private labeling may well induce 
the consolidation of the retail industry. 
With private labeling, the channel makes the highest profit in table 1 under 
duopoly, when the products are all highly differentiated ( 5.0 ). If the national brand 
manufacturer could choose product differentiation through advertising, he would wish to 
promote maximal differentiation (provided that the price of advertising is sufficiently 
low, as we will see in more detail few lines below). This result is not surprising, given 
that it aims at mitigating quantity competition between retailers. However, offsetting 
effects, not considered yet, may well be working in reality and convince the retailer to 
imitate the national brand rather than to offer a highly differentiated product. For example 
the cost savings of imitation in packaging and/or the negotiation motivation of the 
imitation strategy illustrated by Scott Morton-Zettelmeyer (2004) can produce this. Also, 
ineffective advertising by national brand manufacturers and/or an advertising unit cost 
too high can produce this. To illustrate the latter point, suppose now that, in a new stage 
at the beginning, the national brand manufacturer could optimally choose  (and 
hence ) through his advertising Z with a unit cost equal to . His profit will now 
become: . Then he will advertise insofar as: 
. If
s
sZqqv
u
 )
0201
(
0)/)(/(/  sdZd
u
dZ
u
d  dZd /  is low or if  is very high, very 
little advertising will be made. For these reasons, it is not to take for granted that, when a 
national brand manufacturer can freely choose advertise, he does it heavily and make 
products very differentiated. Proposition 1 could thus hold even when national brand 
manufacturers can choose advertising.  
s
         But when downstream monopolization brings about a strong increase in the 
retailer’s bargaining power, the national brand manufacturer can find it profitable to 
avoid downstream monopolization. See Colangelo (2006) for a more detailed analysis in 
this direction.16 Proposition 1 thus holds only when the latter event does not occur. 
5. Private Labeling with Wholesale Price Discrimination 
Now we study how private labeling affects the individual and social desirability of 
downstream competition under wholesale price discrimination. This more complex 
pricing is often observed in vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers and 
hence the analysis now becomes more realistic. Furthermore, it is interesting to see 
whether private labeling can coexist with nonlinear pricing. Mills (1999, pag.135) has 
indeed pointed out that private labeling could not occur when a wholesale two-part tariff 
is feasible given that, with this form of wholesale pricing, double marginalization could 
be absent. This conjecture is however at variance with empirical evidence.    
                                                          
16 A noncooperative bilateral bargaining model like the famous Rubinstein’s (1982) would give the same 
result under appropriate parameter conditions.
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Wholesale price discrimination could be used by a leading national brand 
manufacturer as a countermove to retailers’ private labeling.17 Remaining in a perfect and 
complete information environment as with linear pricing, this section will focus on 
wholesale perfect price discrimination. This gives the manufacturer the maximal ability 
to defend him from private labeling by choosing wholesale pricing optimally.18 They do 
however face a limit in their ability to exploit retailers through wholesale price 
discrimination: due to a retailer’s ability to market a private label, the retailer could 
indeed refuse the sales proposal, sell only her private label and still make a profit. Private 
labeling thus represents an outside option for retailers, which guarantees them a strictly 
positive reservation profit, even when the manufacturer has the ability of practicing 
wholesale perfect price discrimination.19 A retailer’s equilibrium reservation profit is thus 
equal to the profit made by them when selling only their private label while their rival 
sells both the national brand and the private label.
In section 2, it was shown that, under no private labeling, and with wholesale 
perfect price discrimination, the manufacturer profit, the retailer profit, the channel profit 
and welfare are all unchanged when downstream competition is introduced. Hence all 
parts are, under these conditions, indifferent to downstream competition. What happens 
with private labeling? To see this, following the same methodology used with linear 
pricing, first the case with downstream competition (a Cournot duopoly) is solved, then 
with no downstream competition (a monopoly retailer), making it possible to draw some 
interesting conclusions by comparing the two equilibrium outcomes.  
When there are two retailers, a system of two retailer-specific two-part tariffs 
( ) is sufficient to implement wholesale perfect price discrimination. In 
the last stage of the game, retailers will choose quantities according to a Cournot 
subgame. We must then reanalyze this subgame allowing possibly discriminatory 
wholesale unit prices: . When this is done, the same analytical procedure as 
2
,
1
,
2
,
1
FFvv
21
vv 
                                                          
17 Let us assume that vertical contracts are public and non renegotiable: if there was a lack of commitment by 
the national brand manufacturer not to renegotiate with a retailer in an attempt to exploit the unobservability 
of a third party contract along the lines highlighted among others by Hart-Tirole (1990) and McAfee-
Schwartz (1994), wholesale price discrimination would not be a good manufacturer countermove to private 
labeling.
18 The comparison between our results, illustrated later, and those obtained by Avenel-Caprice (2006) in a 
different but related model under a single two-part tariff suggests that our assumption of wholesale perfect 
price discrimination is not driving the obtained results. They should indeed hold qualitatively even under 
more restricted wholesale pricing schemes.
19 We can see in numerical simulations that, in these circumstances, retailer profit may well be higher than 
that of the national brand manufacturer.
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under linear pricing leads to the following matrix equation: , where:  
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By inverting matrix and post-multiplying it with vector A w , we get the four 
equilibrium product demands by retailers that we report in the Appendix as (A11)-(A14) 
and that solve the last stage subgame. In stage 1 the two retailer-specific fixed fees will 
be optimally set by the manufacturer with the aim of leaving each retailer respectively 
only their reservation profit. They will then be determined as follows: 
with , where  represents the j-th retailer’s strictly 
positive reservation profit. In turn, the manufacturer profit results in: 
. Substituting for the former equation in the latter, the 
manufacturer profit can be expressed as follows: 
. The (national brand) manufacturer will 
get the channel profit net of the reservation profits paid to retailers. He chooses and
with the aim of maximizing his profit under the constraint of (2), (3), (4), (A11), 
(A12), (A13), (A14). Before proceeding to their determination, however, we need to find 
the retailers’ equilibrium reservation profits. We find them in the Appendix (see B.b). It 
turns out that: ; and 
 where 
. While retailer 1’s reservation profit does not depend on 
wholesale unit prices, retailer 2’s reservation profit does depend on . The higher ,
the higher . This strictly depends on
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demand functions has been introduced through this (realistic) assumption and this affects 
the reservation profits, which have become asymmetric too. Notice that, when 1 ,
symmetry is restored: . When 9/1
21
__
  1	 , the manufacturer will consider this 
asymmetry in determining their optimal wholesale pricing. In particular, they will want to 
make a wholesale price discrimination against retailer 2 based on a low , with the aim 
of controlling the size of retailer profit.
1
v
Having obtained the retailers’ equilibrium reservation profits, we are in a position 
to determine the optimal wholesale unit prices. Unfortunately the solutions appear very 
cumbersome and only an implicit formulation is provided in the Appendix [see (A18)-
(A19)]. We focus instead on numerical analysis that nevertheless allows us to study 
retailers’ product line decisions induced by the national brand manufacturer’s wholesale 
pricing and product substitutability.  
As it emerges clearly from figure 2, we have identified two different equilibrium 
product line patterns. When the brands are not close substitutes (area A in figure 2), the 
manufacturer practices a highly discriminatory wholesale pricing and induces retailer 2 
not to offer the national brand. Only retailer 1 offers both brands. When instead the 
brands are close substitutes (area B in figure 2), the manufacturer practices a rather flat 
wholesale pricing and hence both retailers offer both brands. The following proposition 
follows:
Proposition 2. With private labeling, under wholesale perfect price discrimination, in 
case of a downstream Cournot duopoly, the national brand manufacturer sets highly 
discriminatory wholesale unit prices and hence induces only one retailer to sell his brand, 
provided that we are in region A in figure 2. When we are in region B, he prefers to 
practice almost no price discrimination and as a result both retailers offer a complete 
product line (national brand and their own private label). 
When goods are very close substitutes (e.g. 99.0  ) the national brand 
manufacturer practices almost no wholesale price discrimination and induces the two 
retailers to sell both brands, because this increases the national brand sales while the 
corresponding national brand price decrease is very small, given the strong cross-effect 
on inverse demands. Retailers’ reservation profits are small so it is good to have both 
active. But when goods are looser substitutes (e.g. 5.0  ), the national brand 
manufacturer finds it profitable to set highly discriminatory pricing against retailer 2, 
inducing the retailer not to offer the national brand and so decreasing their reservation 
profit. Both national brand sales and prices will decrease slightly but with the advantage  
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of reducing retailer 2’s reservation profit -this latter effect is the driving factor in this 
case.

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  Figure 2 – Retailers’ Equilibrium Product Lines with Wholesale Price  
                   Discrimination in Case of a Downstream Duopoly. 
We can now proceed to the study of the two relevant cases not yet analyzed: the 
case with two retailers in which only one sells the national brand ( ) that occurs 
in area A of figure 2 and the monopoly retailer case. Only after that will it be possible to 
evaluate the impact of private labeling on downstream competition under wholesale price 
discrimination. 
0
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q
         When retailer 2 does not sell the national brand ( ),  the inverse demand 
equations become the following: ,
 and . The profit functions are 
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Again, the national brand manufacturer will set F to leave retailer 1 only his reservation 
profit: . The national brand manufacturer profit is thus equal to: 
. The latter term is determined as the profit retailer 1 would make 
if they refused the sales proposal from the national brand manufacturer. In this case both 
retailers would sell only their private labels. It is easy to show that retailer 1’s reservation 
profit is unchanged as compared with the previous case: .  From the 
retailers’ optimization problem in stage 2, substituting the reaction functions with each 
other and after some algebraic manipulations, we get their equilibrium demand functions, 
which are entered as (A15)-(A17) in the Appendix. In stage 1 the national brand 
manufacturer sets the wholesale price with the aim of maximizing his profit under the 
constraint of the above expressed inverse demand functions and of (A15)-(A17). It is 
straightforward to calculate that optimal  is given by (A20). The solutions for 
quantities, manufacturer profit, channel profit and welfare are all reported in the 
Appendix as (A21)-(A26). 
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Let us now study private labeling under wholesale perfect price discrimination in 
the case of a monopoly retailer. Assume that only retailer 1 is active (then we have: 
). The inverse product demand equations in this case are: 
and . The profit equations are respectively: 
and . The national brand manufacturer 
will set the fixed fee so as to leave the retailer only their reservation profit. The national 
brand manufacturer profit is thus equal to: .It  is clear that 
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 . In the final stage, the retailer decides how much of the two brands to offer; the 
following equilibrium demand functions are easily established: 
and . In stage 1 
the national brand manufacturer will set v  to maximize his profit under the constraint of 
the above defined inverse demand functions and the retailer’s equilibrium product 
demands. It is clear that wholesale marginal cost pricing is optimal: . Hence a 
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simple computation shows that: , ,
  and 
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Having solved the monopoly retailer case, it is now possible to compare the two 
cases studied. While manufacturer profit is always higher with a downstream monopoly, 
welfare is always higher with a downstream duopoly. As for channel profit, everything 
depends on parameter values. Figure 3 shows the two existing regions (obtained by 
numerical simulations), in which channel profit is higher respectively with a downstream 
duopoly and with a downstream monopoly.The following proposition thus holds: 
Proposition 3. When both retailers can market their own private labels and there is 
wholesale perfect price discrimination, the national brand manufacturer prefers to have a 
monopoly retailer. The vertical channel prefers a downstream monopoly only when 
goods are not loose substitutes (area B in figure 3). When they are loose substitutes, the 
vertical channel prefers a downstream duopoly (area A in figure 3). Welfare is always 
higher with a downstream duopoly. 
The conflict of interest between firms and consumers is stronger with wholesale price 
discrimination than with linear pricing, because in the former case, unlike the latter, a 
downstream monopoly is preferable for the vertical channel for a larger range of product 
substitutability and because the national brand manufacturer is always in favor of a 
downstream monopoly. Thus, private labeling has an even stronger role in the 
consolidation of the retail industry under  wholesale pricing. The national brand 
manufacturer (and often the vertical channel) finds it profitable to restrict the number of 
retailers, with the aim of mitigating product competition from private labels and thus 
increasing retail prices significantly. Only when products are loose substitutes can the 
vertical channel accept the (slightly) lower retail prices given by downstream 
competition, to achieve a strong sales increase both for the national brand and private 
labels.
Even in the absence of a double mark-up, as might happen with wholesale perfect 
price discrimination, private labeling remains profitable for the vertical channel. This 
applies both with a monopoly retailer and with a downstream duopoly (but, in the latter 
case, provided that products are not too close substitutes).Thus, with wholesale perfect 
price discrimination, the rationale for private labeling does not rely necessarily on 
mitigating the double mark-up, as it was in Mills (1995), but rather on offering a more 
satisfactory product line to customers, by increasing product variety. This makes 
consumer surplus higher and gives the vertical channel the chance of more fully 
appropriating it. Private labeling can thus easily coexist with (wholesale) nonlinear 
pricing.
As a further by-product, comparing the equilibrium product lines under linear 
pricing with those under wholesale perfect price discrimination, it has also been 
demonstrated that the available wholesale pricing scheme plays a crucial role in 
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determining the equilibrium product line. Ceteris paribus, linear pricing makes identical 
and complete equilibrium product lines more probable, while, with wholesale perfect 
price discrimination, different and partial product lines are more likely. 
    1 
             0.74
                                                            B
                                                                                                             
                               A                                                                                                            
0.82                         1 
A: Channel profit higher with downstream duopoly 
B: Channel profit higher with downstream monopoly 
  Figure 3 - Comparing Channel Profit with a Downstream Duopoly Against a  
                  Downstream Monopoly under Private Labeling and with  
                  Wholesale Price Discrimination 
6. Conclusions 
We have seen that private labeling may well have anticompetitive effects in the retail 
industry, favoring a monopoly retailer, while without it, some competition between 
retailers would take place. This occurs regardless of the available wholesale pricing 
scheme: either with linear pricing or with price discrimination. However, wholesale price 
discrimination makes a downstream monopoly more likely than linear pricing, because, 
unlike the latter case, in the former case the national brand manufacturer is in favor of a 
single retailer for any kind of product substitutability and the vertical channel is more 
often in favor of a downstream monopoly.  
The data collected by ACNielsen (2005), in showing a strong positive correlation 
between country-level private label shares and retailer concentration (measured by CR5), 
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seem consistent with the explanation offered in the paper. Of the 38 countries studied, all 
fit the above mentioned correlation with the exception of the four Scandinavian countries 
(e.g. Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark), where the retail industry is highly 
concentrated but private label penetration is small. 
A cumulative process thus seems likely: if high concentration in the retail 
industry fosters private labeling (indeed, only large retailers can afford to market private 
labels), there are also reasons to believe that this phenomenon in turn brings about more 
concentration in the industry. 
Because of this negative long-run effect of private labeling, antitrust authorities 
should be more severe with large grocery retailers, in particular through a careful scrutiny 
of their Merger & Acquisition operations, especially in countries where private labeling 
is highly developed. 
Two additional results were reached on the theme of private labeling and 
equilibrium product lines: (i) even in the absence of a double mark-up problem, which is 
common with (wholesale) nonlinear pricing, private labels may well arise in equilibrium: 
they represent in this case an instrument to offer a better product line; (ii) in determining 
the equilibrium product line, the available wholesale pricing scheme plays a crucial role: 
ceteris paribus, with linear pricing, identical and complete product lines occur in 
equilibrium; with wholesale perfect price discrimination, different and incomplete 
product lines are more likely. 
Two issues have proved important in obtaining these results: advertising and 
bargaining power. When advertising is very effective in increasing product differentiation 
and is not very costly, firms prefer to have downstream competition between very 
differentiated products, even under private labeling. Also, when a bilateral monopoly 
would bring too much negotiation power to the retailer, the national brand manufacturer 
prefers to have more downstream competition even with private labels. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the effects we study could change if we started from a higher number of 
retailers. Results have been reached by comparing equilibrium outcomes respectively 
with one and with two retailers. Analytical complexity prevented us from investigating a 
more general situation. 
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Appendix
A.  Private Labeling with Linear Pricing: the Duopoly Case 
a. The retailers’ equilibrium demand functions 
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b. The solutions 
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Given the equilibrium retailer demand functions expressed as (A11)-(A14) and given the 
resulting equilibrium retailer reservation profits, the upstream monopolist in stage 1 
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